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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Glatz, Jacqueline 
NY SID 
DIN: 18-0-0451 
Ap_pearances: Andre Sedlak, Esq. 
11 Market Street, Suite 205 
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601 
Facility: Taconic CF 
Appeal Control No.: 11-139-18 R 
Decision appealed: October 22, 2018 revocation of release and imposition of a time assessment of 18 
months. 
Final Revocation October 22, 2018 
Hearin8 Date: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received May 13, 2019 
Appeals Unit Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Review: 





The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_ ·Affirmed _Reversed, remanded for de novo bearing 
_Vacated for de novo review of time assessment only 
Affirmed _Reversed, re~anded for de novo hearing 
_Vacated for de novo review of time assessment only 
_ )teversed, violation vacated 
/Modified to 1"2.-- t'HO 
~ed, violation vacated 
~ified to ) t. 1-1 tJ 
Affirmed _Reversed, remanded for de novo bearing _Reversed, violation vacated 
_Vacated for de novo review of time assessment only .J(°Modified to I~ 1'\l\c) 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ/ate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the lrunate and the Inmate's Counsel,' if any, on ~ I 3( 2DJ 9 . 
L/3' 
Distribution: Appeals Unit -Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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Appellant challenges the October 22, 2018 determination of the administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”) revoking release and imposing an 18-month time assessment.  Appellant argues: (1) The 
ALJ relied on erroneous information that her minimum penalty was 2 years when the minimum 
was instead a revocation and restoration to community supervision; (2) Appellant did not receive 
effective assistance of counsel (According to the appeal brief: “A review of the Petitioner’s hearing 
transcript reveals the most blatant example of ineffective assistance of counsel that [appeal 
counsel] has ever seen. [] The only way the Attorney’s lack of representation could have been any 
worse is if the Attorney had slept through the hearing”) (Appeal Brief, p.18); (3) Appellant’s prior 
criminal record was over-emphasized; (4) The ALJ demonstrated bias toward appellant based on 
her age (Citing certain remarks during the hearing at, for example, Transcript, page 8: “if I had a 
choice with limited resources… I probably would want to put the resources with an 18-year old. 
I’ve got a better shot of that working than someone who’s in their 50’s because its engrained.”); 
(5) The Board acted unlawfully in relying upon information that was not provided to appeal 
counsel despite its having been requested by correspondence to Taconic Correctional Facility; (6) 
The revocation decision failed to state the evidence relied upon; (7) That appellant understood her 
rights was not established by a preponderance of the evidence; (8) The ALJ effectively acted as a 
sentencing judge; (9) The time assessment is excessive.   
 
There is no basis to conclude that the decision to revoke appellant’s parole is infirm.  As is 
explained further below, however, a modification of the time assessment is being recommended 
based upon one of appellant’s claims and the record of this matter. 
 
Appellant’s contention that the ALJ relied upon erroneous information that her minimum 
penalty was 2 years is an obvious misconstruing of the ALJ’s remarks during the hearing.  The 
appeal brief cites the ALJ’s explicit references to the minimum term of incarceration that had been 
imposed by the sentencing judge upon appellant’s underlying conviction.  Appellant was an 
alleged violator who would be, and ultimately was, deemed outside the revocation guidelines, for 
having been directed to the Willard Drug Treatment Campus program by the sentencing court as 
an alternative to service of the minimum term of incarceration. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8005.20(d).  There 
is no guidance in the Board’s regulations with respect to the time assessment that should be 
imposed for such a parole violator, and the time assessment may be all the way up to a hold to the 
maximum expiration of the violator’s sentence. Id.; Executive Law § 259-i(3)(f)(x).  There is 
nothing arbitrary and capricious about consideration of the minimum term as a potential time 
assessment penalty, nor is there any indication in the record that the ALJ believed he was bound 
to that term here.  In fact, it is undisputed that the time assessment imposed – 18 months – was 
less than appellant’s minimum term.  Appellant’s argument here also cuts against those parts of 
the appeal that complain of the ALJ’s alleged bias for not restoring her to a program – that 
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argument implicitly recognizes that the ALJ was aware the disposition could be a restoration to 
supervision.   
 
“[T]here is nothing to substantiate [appellant’s] contention that [s]he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel as the record discloses that [s]he received meaningful 
representation”. Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Board of Parole, 106 A.D.3d 
1300, 1300-1301, 965 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Bond v Stanford, 171 A.D.3d 
1320, 97 N.Y.S.3d 807 (3d Dept. 2019).  “‘[M]eaningful representation’ does not mandate a 
flawless performance”. People v. Alexander, 161 A.D.2d 1035, 1037, 558 N.Y.S.2d 200, 202 (3d 
Dept. 1990), appeal den., 76 N.Y.2d 851, 560 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1990).   
 
 There is no support for appellant’s complaint that her prior criminal record was improperly 
emphasized.  Her criminal history was most certainly an appropriate factor to consider in 
determining the penalty to be imposed. Matter of Rosa v Fischer, 108 A.D.3d 1227, 969 N.Y.S.2d 
706 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Bell v. Lemons, 78 A.D.3d 1393, 910 N.Y.S.2d 701 (3d Dept. 
2010); People ex rel. Brazeau v. McLaughlin, 233 A.D.2d 724, 650 N.Y.S.2d 361 (3d Dept. 1996).  
Moreover, in his written revocation decision, the ALJ properly cited appellant’s criminal history, 
but also the fact that the violative behavior had occurred so soon after her release to supervision in 
the community. See, Matter of Wilson v. Evans, 104 A.D.3d 1190, 960 N.Y.S.2d 807 (4th Dept. 
2013); See also, Matter of Swinson v. Warden, 75 A.D.3d 433, 903 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1st Dept. 2010).   
 
Appellant further argues that the Board acted unlawfully by relying upon information that 
was not provided to appeal counsel and which had been requested through letter of counsel to 
Taconic Correctional Facility.  By letter dated April 24, 2019 appeal counsel submitted a 
voluminous request for documents, the vast majority of which patently have no bearing on 
appellant’s parole revocation case (E.g., from the correspondence attached as Exhibit C to the 
Appeal Brief:  “A copy of transcripts from any of the Inmate’s sentencing proceedings”, “Copies 
of each of the commissioners’ notes for the commissioner that conducted the parole release 
hearing”).  Such items were never mentioned at the hearing, never admitted into evidence, and 
clearly never considered by the ALJ (Parole Revocation Decision Notice, page 2).  The relevance 
of those items on appeal, of course, is lacking, but they could have had no effect on the underlying 
revocation decision to begin with.  The only relevant item admitted into evidence per the 
revocation decision was the violation of release report, and the appeal brief includes a copy of that 
report.   
 
Appellant’s complaint concerning the release of records by DOCCS is in any event beyond 
the scope of this appeal. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8006.3.  Nevertheless, it is notable that there would be no 
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genuine claim here no matter what.  Appeal counsel filed notice of appearance on approximately 
March 13, 2019, and waited almost a month and a half before submitting the records request to 
Taconic Correctional Facility.  That request was dated only a little over two weeks before the May 
10, 2019 date of the appeal brief, and less than three weeks before the May 13, 2019 appeal 
perfection deadline.  The appeal brief was simply submitted, and there was no request by counsel 
beforehand for an extension of the deadline based on some alleged failure by DOCCS to provide 
records.  The appeal at best seeks to utilize counsel’s own delay as the prime input for a 
manufactured claim against DOCCS. See, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5.    
 
Appellant’s assertion that the revocation decision failed to state the evidence relied upon 
is conclusory and meritless.  The written decision more than adequately met the requirement that 
appellant be informed of its reasons and the evidence relied upon, and no further detail was 
necessary. Executive Law § 259-i(3)(f)(xi); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8005.20(e); See, Ramos v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 852, 752 N.Y.S.2d 159 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Hacker v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 228 A.D.2d 849, 644 N.Y.S.2d 97 (3d Dept. 1996).  No greater 
specificity on the record of the hearing was needed either.  Appellant’s guilt and the revocation of 
her parole was well established by her guilty plea. Matter of Gonzalez v. Artus, 107 A.D.3d 1568, 
966 N.Y.S.2d 710 (4th Dept. 2013); Fuller v. Goord, 299 A.D.2d 849, 749 N.Y.S.2d 628 (4th Dept. 
2002), appeal dismissed, 100 N.Y.2d 531, 761 N.Y.S.2d 592 (2003); Ramos v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 852, 752 N.Y.S.2d 159 (3d Dept. 2002). 
 
  The record, moreover, contradicts any suggestion by the appeal that the plea was not 
knowing and voluntary or that appellant did not understand her rights. See, Matter of James v. 
Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole, 106 A.D.3d 1300, 965 N.Y.S.2d 235 (3d Dept. 
2013).  Hearing counsel plainly represented that appellant was advised of “her rights and available 
pleas” (Transcript, p.12), and there is a presumption that such representation was accurate. See, 
Matter of Jeffrey V., 82 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 603 N.Y.S.2d 800, 803 (1993).  No requirement exists 
that a parole violator’s understanding otherwise be established by a “preponderance of the 
evidence”.  Though there are additional remarks within the appeal meant to suggest that the ALJ 
exerted a coercive influence over the plea in this matter, there is no evidence of this. Matter of 
Almonte v. Fischer, 70 A.D.3d 1156, 1157, 894 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (3d Dept. 2010), lv. denied, 
14 N.Y.3d 709, 903 N.Y.S.2d 768 (2010); Matter of Burch v Venettozzi, 160 A.D.3d 1328, 72 
N.Y.S.3d 507 (3d Dept. 2018); See, People v. Phillips, 71 A.D.3d 1181, 896 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 
(3d Dept. 2010).  Surely, informing appellant of the time assessment that would be imposed with 
the offered plea and the reasons for such is not coercive. See generally, People v. Villone, 302 
A.D.2d 866, 753 N.Y.S.2d 778 (4th Dept. 2003), appeal denied, 4 N.Y.3d 768, 792 N.Y.S.2d 12 
(2005).    
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As previously explained, the ALJ acted appropriately in noting the minimum of appellant’s 
sentence imposed on her crime of conviction, her criminal record and the recency of her violation.  
The record is unequivocal that the ALJ also understood the lawful disposition options for appellant 
as an “outside the guidelines” violator (Transcript, p.2). 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8005.20(d).  The ALJ 
could not legitimately be said to have acted as a “sentencing judge” in excess of his role, which 
clearly required a determination by him as to what to do with appellant upon a revocation of her 
release. Executive Law § 259-i(3)(f)(x); See, People ex rel. Persing v. Lacy, 276 A.D.2d 815, 714 
N.Y.S.2d 143 (3d Dept. 2000).  Furthermore, the time assessment was not “excessive” in light of 
the properly consider factors already discussed.            
 
To the extent the appeal highlights comments during the hearing with respect to appellant’s 
age it is significant that such comments were a part of the discussion of the type of disposition in 
the possible plea bargain agreement – in particular, the ALJ’s indication that he was not offering 
appellant any form of program disposition.  The comments were not directed to the question of 
appellant’s guilt or innocence of the violation charges.  The ALJ also explicitly mentioned the lack 
of availability of community-based programming and the length of time that appellant might have 
to wait in jail to determine such availability.  Nevertheless, the ALJ’s specific remarks as to 
appellant’s age render the record in this matter ambiguous on the question of whether restoration 
to a program, or provision for a DOCCS alternative program, was appropriately dispensed with as 
a possible disposition upon appellant’s plea.  Under the totality of the circumstances, a 
modification of the disposition is therefore reasonable.  Inasmuch as the underlying parole warrant 
was lodged in September 2018 and appellant has served almost 12 months in custody since then, 
a modification to a 12-month time assessment is recommended.  That time assessment would 
expire in September 2019. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.6(b)(1).   
  
 
Recommendation:  Modify time assessment to 12 months and, as so modified, affirm. 
